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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal arises out of the jury trial of a lawsuit stemming from a low-impact rear end

automobile collision in which Appellant sustained only soft tissue damage to
now challenges the District Court's denial of her Motion for Additur or in

neck. Appellant

Alternative

After a two day jury trial, the Appellant sought relief pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil

Trial.
I-'rc\r''''''

59(a)(5) and (6), contending that the jury should have awarded her more money. In a fourteen (14)
page Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Additur and in the Alternative
for a New Trial ("Order"), the District Court rejected Appellant's arguments. This appeal followed.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appellant commenced this negligence action on October 7,20] 0 in the Fifth Judicial District

of the State of Idaho, County of Twin Falls. R., 8. A pretrial hearing was held on July 5, 2011,
where the District Court granted Respondent Kimberly Baumann's (hereinafter "Baumann" or
Respondent) Motion to Allow the Videotaped Trial Testimony of

Richard Knoebel,

Alternatively, Motion for Continuance. R, 179-83. The videotaped deposition of Dr.

was

taken on July 13,2011. Supp. Transcript on Appeal, at 4. More than fourteen (14) days

trial,

Baumann served on the Appellant a $25,000 offer of judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 68. R, 289-291. Appellant did not accept the offer of judgment. R, 342-44.
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A two day jury trial was held on July 19 and 20, 2011; the Honorable Randy J. Stoker,
District Judge, presided. Transcript on Appeal. The only issues tried were causation and damages.
R.,335. The jury awarded Appellant $2,787.50 in economic damages and $15,000 in non-economic
general damages. R.,336. A judgement was entered on July 26,2011. R.,263-264. After the trial,
both parties sought recovery of their trial costs and the Appellant filed a Motion for Additur and in
the Alternative Motion for New Trial. The District Court denied Plaintiff'
in the Alternative Motion for New Trial and awarded net costs to the Defendant in

and
amount of

$1,988.41. R.,344. An amended judgment was entered on August 23,201 L

C.

STATEl\1ENT OF FACTS
This is a personal injury lawsuit resulting from a low-impact automobile collision that

occurred in Kimberly, Idaho, on October 20, 2008 (hereinafter the "Accident"). Transcript on
Appeal, 88-9.

Baumann rear-ended the Appellant at a speed of approximately 10-15 mph.

Transcript on Appeal, 89. The Appellant did not seek medical attention at the scene of the Accident,
but went to the emergency room for lower back pain later in the day after of the accident. Transcript
on Appeal, 211.
The Appellant confirmed during the trial that she first sought treatment

forming

the primary basis of her damage claim, pain in her upper back and cervical area, a couple
after the Accident. Transcript on Appeal, 212. Subsequently, the Appellant began obtaining
treatment from chiropractor Dr. Brad Turner, and then approximately six months after the Accident
from neurologist, Dr. Hammond. Transcript on Appeal, 113.
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Thejury heard evidence about the Appellant' s medical history, which included several prior
back surgeries, pre-existing neck cervical pain and fibromyalgia. Transcript on Appeal, 100-04,303,
162-63, 315, 168, 175; R. 333. Appellant described how, after the Accident, she was injured in a
Winco parking lot, and, as a result, had commenced a personal injury lawsuit arising from that
incident. Transcript on Appeal 242-57. During cross-examination, Appellant recounted how the
injuries she sustained in the Winco incident affected her life in ways that significantly accorded with
how the injuries caused by the Accident affected her life.

Transcript on Appeal

At trial, Baumann presented the videotaped controversy of Dr. Richard Knoebel. Supp.
Transcript on Appeal. In contrast to the testimony of Appellant's medical witnesses, Dr. Knoebel
testified that the Appellant did not sustain significant, permanent or long-term injury, and that
Appellants' Complaints were more likely consistent with her preexisting pain complaints. SUpp.
Transcript on Appeal, 9-10,13-15.

D.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a District Court's ruling on a motion for new trial

an abuse of

discretion. See Palmer v. Spain, M.D., 138 Idaho 798, 800,69 P.3d 1059, 1061 (2003); see also
Sheridan v. St. Lukes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 780,

P.3d

District Court abused its discretion, this Court affirms the District Court's ruling.

1). Unless the
Sheridan v.

S1. Lukes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho at 780,25 P.3d at 93. In reviewing a discretionary matter, this

Court performs a three part analysis to determine if the District Court: (l) "corrected perceived the
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issue as discretionary; (2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." See Palmer v.

Spain, M.D., 138 Idaho at 800,69 P.3d at 1061.
II.
RESPONDENT'S RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES THAT
HAVE BEEN PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY THE APPELLANT
AND THE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR AN A';YARD 0 F
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5)?

2.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6)?

3.

Is Respondent entitled to award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-121.

III.
ARGUMENT
In this instance, the District Court correctly perceived that the decision to grant a Motion for
New Trial Brought Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) and (6) is a matter of discretion.

See R. 336, 338. Therefore, the analysis turns to whether the District Court acted within the bounds
of its considerable discretion in reaching its decision, and whether it exercised reason
its decision. Palmer v. Spain, M.D., 138 Idaho at 800, 69 P.3d at 1061. As discussed below, it is
evident the District Court acted within its discretion in reaching its decision, and manifestly
exercised a high level of reason in denying Appellants' Motion for Additur and in the Alternative
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for a New Trial.

A.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Appellant's Motion for
New Trial Brought Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure S9(a)(S).
The Appellant moved for a new trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5),

which authorizes the District Court to grant a new trial for "inadequate damages, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." lRCP.59(a)(5). The District Court also
may conditionally grant a new trial subject to additur. See lRCP. 59.1.
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5), the District Court "must weigh the evidence
and then compare the jury's award to what he would have given had there been no jury. If the
disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence of
passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand." Teton Springs v. V.R. Invests., 145 Idaho 716,
718-19. In lUling on a motion for a new trial, the district court should distinguish the grounds upon
which it is based. See Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 773, 727 P.2d 1187, 1201 (1986). Although
less explanation is required in denying a motion for new trial than in granting one, the trial court still
must identify "where in the record it reveals, that the moving party has failed to meets its burden to
justify granting the motion." See id., 111 Idaho at 773, 727 P.2d at 1201.
Here, the District Court weighed the evidence, compared the jury's award to what the District
Court would have awarded if there was no trial, and concluded the "verdict was not so disparate with
a reasonable view of the evidence as to suggest an award under the 'influence of passion or
prejudice'." R, 340. In so doing, the District Court pointed to various parts of the record that
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revealed why the Appellant failed to establish the jury's verdict was "given under the influence of
passion or prejudice" see Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5), and observed that the jury's
$15,000 award of general damages was in line with what the Court would have awarded at a bench
trial, "given the finding that the cervical injury was not permanent." R., 340.
As to the purported "permanence" of the Appellant's injury, the District Court

that

the evidence was "highly contested." For example, Baumann's expert, Dr. Knoebel, testified
Appellant sustained "no significant injury or long-term permanent injury" as a

ofthe

Supp. Transcript on Appeal, 9-10, 13-15. Dr. Knoebel added that Appellant' "chronic pain
complaints are most consistent with her preexisting chronic pain complaints," including
fibromyalgia, and "not the motor vehicle accident." Supp. Transcript on Appeal, 9-10, 13-15. From
the evidence the jury heard, the District Court reasoned that it could reasonably conclude the
Appellant's cervical injury was not permanent. R.,339. The District Court also observed that the
jury heard evidence from which it could conclude the motor vehicle accident was minor. R., 340.
Moreover, the District Court pointed out that the jury heard evidence the Appellant had a
preexisting lower back condition and "numerous medical issues ... including
testimony about whether Plaintiff had pre-existing fibromyalgia."
examination, and contrary to Appellant's representation that there was "no medical

disputed
crossthat

established or corroborated either an accurate diagnosis of fibromyalgia or any ongoing treatment
for the condition," see Appellant's Brief at 16, Appellant's own neurologist conceded that he

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 6

prescribed her "Cymbalta ... for the fibromyalgia aspects of her symptoms." See Transcript on
Appeal, at 175. The same neurologist admitted that the Federal Drug Administration approved
another drug prescribed the Appellant, Savella, "strictly" for fibromyalgia.

See Transcript on

Appeal, at 303; 162-63. Then Dr. Hammond equivocated about whether he really ever treated the
Appellant for fibromyalgia, stating that the "reason" he reported fibromyalgia in his
records was to "try and get her medical coverage to pay for it."

See Transcript on Appeal, at 3 I 5;

168; 175. The jury heard ample evidence that Appellant was treated
fibromyalgia.
Appellant's apparent contention that the District Court should have expressly found
Plaintiff's medical service providers more credible and, as a result, reversed the jury's decision,
misapprehends the judge's role in deciding a 59(a)(5) motion. First, as the District Court noted,
there was evidence in the record challenging the credibility and biases of the medical witnesses,
which would include Appellants'. R., 341. Second, it is "a jury function to set the damage award
based on its sense of fairness and justice" and the "trial judge must defer to the jury, unless it is
apparent to the trial judge that there was a great disparity" between the jury's

what the

trial judge would have awarded such that it "shocks the conscience" or is Ul1(::OflSCllOna!J1
v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 536, 903 P.2d 110, 125 (App. 1995). In this case,
expressly stated that the $2,787.50 in special damages was consistent with a finding that
Appellant's cervical injury was not permanent. R., 339. This conclusion was buttressed by the fact
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that Appellant's medical services witnesses offered no testimony as to how to apportion damages
between Appellant's extensive preexisting injuries and those caused by the Accident. R., 339.
Moreover, the District Court observed that the $15,000 award in general damages was consistent
with the evidence the jury heard. R.,340.
Simply put, the District Court's analysis denying the Appellant'S Motion for New Trial
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) was within the outer bounds of the court's permissible
discretion and well-reasoned. See Beale v. Speck, 1271daho at 536, 903 P.2d 110 at 1

(affirming

District Court's denial of motion for new trial under Rule 59(a)(5) based on disputed evidence that
failed to "shock the conscience" or appeared to have been the result of "passion or prejudice"). This
case involved hotly disputed evidence and impeached witnesses. As such, this case is factually
distinguishable from Dinneen v. Finch, where the defendant failed to controvert the Plaintiff's
evidence of personal injury, lost wages and personal property. See 100 Idaho 620, 626, 603 P.2d
575,561 (1979). Therefore, the rule that ajury or fact-finder must accept as true the uncontradicted
testimony of unimpeached witnesses is inapplicable. See id. 100 Idaho at 626-27, 603 P.2d at 56162. There is no manifest abuse of the District Court's wide discretion.

Sheridan v. Jmnbura,

135 Idaho at 788,25 P.3d at 101.
B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denving Appellant's :Motion for
New Trial Brought Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6).
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6), the District Court "must weight the evidence

and determine (1) whether the verdict is against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence;
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and (2) whether a new trial would produce a different result." Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. v.
Idaho Transportation Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 833, 136 P.3d 297,304 (2006); see also Harger v. Teton
Springs Golf & Casting, LLC, 145 Idaho 716,719,184 P.3d 841,844 (2008). "If, having given full
respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a new triaL"
Quick v. Crane, III Idaho at 768,727 P.2d at 1196, quoting U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364
( 1948).
Applying these principles, it is evident the District Court did not abuse its wide discretion
in denying the Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6).
The District Court's Memorandum Decision spent approximately three pages summarizing the
evidence submitted by both parties to the jury. R.,332-335. Based on that evidence, the Court could
not "say that the jury's verdict in this case is against the clear weight of the evidence." R., 341. The
District Court reiterated that the pivotal issue was whether Appellant proved that her injury was
permanent. R.,341. The District Court noted that there was substantial evidence in the record to
support each party's position, and, furthermore, sufficient evidence challenging the bias and
credibility of the medical witnesses. R., 341. Likewise, the District Court observed that "[c ]redible
arguments can be and were made in support" of the parties' respective positions. R.,341. Because
of the District Court's "unique position of having heard all of the testimony and examined all of the
evidence," its "weighing ofthe evidence in a motion for new trial is given considerable discretion."
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See Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho at 790,25 P.3d at 103. The mere fact that the Appellant thought
her medical providers were more credible than Dr. Knoebel is irrelevant to the issue before this
Court, which is whether the District Court abused its discretion in ruling that the jury's verdict was
not against the clear weight of the evidence. The District Court's reasoning is solid. There was no
abuse of discretion.
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in addressing the second prong required when
analyzing whether to grant a new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). The District
Court considered whether a "new trial would produce a different result;" however, it could not rule
that a new trial would change the result. R, 341; see Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho at 790, 25
P.3d at 103. While the District Court astutely acknowledged that a different trial could reach a
different result, it noted that the test was whether it would. R, 341. And having tried personal injury
cases with facts similar to the one at issue here, the District Court stated that the results of those
cases were "very similar" to the jury's verdict in the instant case. R, 341. The Trial Court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to find that a new trial would produce a different result.

C.

The Court Should Denv Appellant's Request for Attornevs' Fees Pursuant to I.e. § 12121 and Instead Award Baumann Attorneys' Fees.
The Appellant's request for attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 is ponderous,

lacks merit and, as such, the Court should deny it. The gist of Appellant's argument is that the
District Court's error in denying Appellant's motion for new trial was so obvious and so egregious
that it was frivolous for Baumann not to wave a white flag and concede defeat. See LC. §12-121;
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see also Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533, 66 P.3d 230,237,244 (2003). The speciousness of
Appellants' contention is made clear by some simple facts. First, the jury did not agree with the
Appellant's valuation ofthe case. Second, Baumann did not agree with Appellant's valuation ofthe
case. 1 And third, the District Court did not agree with Appellant's valuation of the case. The same
facts, however, are evidence that Appellant has pursued this appeal frivolously and
such that an award ofIdaho Code § 12-121 attorneys' fees to Baumann is warranted.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Baumann respectfully urges this Court to affirm the District Court's Memorandum Opinion
and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Additur and in the Alternative for a New TriaL
Furthermore, Baumann requests that the Court deny Appellant's request for attorney's fees pursuant
to Idaho Code § 12-121, and, instead, grant Baumann an award of attorney's fees pursuant to that
statute. Baumann also requests costs incurred on appeal.
Respectfully Submitted this _ _ day of May, 2012.

Michael
Attorney

1

Recall that Baumann served a $25,000 dollar offer of judgment.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

2'1

day of May, 2012, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF were served upon the following:

Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Telephone: (208) 830-8084
Facsimile: (208) 939-7136
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